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How metacognition and (reading) strategies develop 
according to Vygotsky
Summary
The paper addresses the concepts of metacognition and (reading) strategies, the origin of which 
is usually traced back to the 1970s. However, the paper argues that conscious awareness, which 
Vygotsky introduced as early as the 1930s, is another term for metacognition. Further, according 
to Vygotsky, “… conscious awareness enters through the gate opened up by scientific concept” 
(Vygotsky 1987: 191, italics added), meaning that metacognitive skills develop in instruction, as 
a function of student’s work with academic concepts. This hypothesis, however, seems to be ignored 
by contemporary, mainstream researchers. For example, an influential study like PIRLS, contradic-
tory to Vygotsky’s hypothesis, assumes that students already at the end of the elementary stage apply 
metacognitive skills – included reading strategies – in order to construct meaning in reading. 
Keywords: metacognition, reading strategies, learning strategies, scientific concepts, Vygotsky
Metacognition and metacognitive skills
Based on a review of international research Roe (2014: 86) concludes that one major char-
acteristic that competent and independent readers have in common is that they can monitor 
or supervise their own reading, by continuously controlling their own comprehension and 
effort. Thus, they have established the ability to think about their own thinking, which in 
the course of the 1970s was conceptualized as metacognition or metacognitive reflection 
(Flavell, Miller, & Miller 2002 [1987]; Fox & Risconscente 2008; Pressley 2000). Also the 
learning strategies and reading strategies concepts, which were introduced during the same 
period of time (Afflerback, Pearson, & Paris 2008; Kulbrandstad 2018) are usually con-
ceived of as the capability of experienced readers to control their reading efforts. The strat-
egy concept also covers the ability to adapt one’s approaches, if they do not result in accept-
able comprehension, which is often the case when readers are exposed to texts experienced 
as demanding (Kulbrandstad 2018). Although there has been some lack of consistency in the 
use of the strategy concept as compared to the skills concept, many authors today agree that 
strategies are regulated by the reader’s underlying metacognitive abilities (Afflerback et al. 
2008). Partly on this background, but also based on a comprehensive research review, Ryd-
land (2007) concludes that the mastery of reading strategies seems to be reserved exactly for 
the category of students who reading researchers refer to as good and independent readers. 
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However, Haugen (2014: 153) – with a reference to Bernstein – suggests that readers, 
in order to develop learning (and reading) strategies, also need to be familiar with the spe-
cialized linguistic repertoire of different academic disciplines. She is supported by Klette 
(2007), who claims that students are exposed to the kind of texts they meet on the lower 
secondary stage in school, and they really need what Popkevitz (1998: 64) has labelled 
“technologies of the self”; an alternative term for metacognitive skills. 
I have selected the research results summarized above in order to clarify certain central 
variables concerning the concept of metacognition and how it is developed. The observation 
that students’ lack of metacognitive skills leads to failure in school when texts are experienced 
as demanding is quite common. However, it is not primarily students’ subjective experiences 
with texts that influence their probability to succeed. Most fundamentally it is their familiarity 
with the specialized linguistic repertoire of different academic disciplines. Thus, the need for 
metacognitive skills will not become evident in school before students are introduced to aca-
demic texts, which usually takes place when students reach the lower secondary level. 
At the introductory stage, both texts and instruction are designed for reading compre-
hension – word comprehension – to occur spontaneously, so that students are enabled to 
concentrate all their attention and efforts on what is considered the main task at this level, 
to establish fluent decoding skills. If comprehension occurs spontaneously, however, stu-
dents are hardly in need of any metacognitively controlled strategies. By becoming fluent 
readers, students instead are being prepared to handle the academic texts of the middle 
stage, as fluent reading skills by reading researchers are considered the most fundamental 
condition for later academic success (e.g. Kulbrandstad 2018). 
Fluent reading skills are therefore probably also a fundamental condition for student’s 
capability to develop metacognitive skills. This is not necessarily a common assumption, 
however, as I will return to later, but it was, at least indirectly, Vygotsky’s position, who is 
the main character in this article. His main hypothesis was that: “… conscious awareness 
enters through the gate opened up by scientific concept” (Vygotsky 1987: 191). Con-
scious awareness he defined as “… an act of consciousness whose object is the activity 
of consciousness itself (Vygotsky 1987: 190). Further he implied that the control required 
for conscious awareness is self-regulation, while the intentionality implied in his concept 
of self-regulation requires conscious awareness. As metacognition is often is defined as 
awareness and understanding of one’s own thought processes (Fox & Risconscente 2008), 
it is anticipated by the concept conscious awareness. 
It should be added, however, that Vygotsky considered cognitive development as more 
important for the establishment of metacognitive skills, than students’ reading skills us 
such, and that he also focused more on general instruction, than on reading instruction. To 
Vygotsky, then, students’ reading skills were important primarily through their influence 
on students’ readiness to take part in instruction in general, which at least at the secondary 
level is quite decisive. 
Further, when Vygotsky’s hypothesis also supports the assumption that students’ fa-
miliarity with the specialized linguistic repertoire of different academic disciplines is de-
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cisive for the development of advanced metacognitive skills, so that metacognition and 
strategic thinking will not develop until the students reach the middle stage, it should also 
be emphasized that Vygotsky’s main emphasis was on students’ ability to think and reflect 
in academic categories, and not on linguistic competence as such. At the same time as this 
position reflects Vygotsky’s focus on instruction in general, it also represents an indepen-
dent aspect of his hypothesis. In my opinion, there are therefore several reasons to inves-
tigate the development of metacognition in relation to reading in the light of Vygotsky’s 
hypothesis more thoroughly, which is my major ambition in the present article.
My most important motive for making Vygotsky’s hypothesis and its educational impli-
cations a subject for explicit discussion, however, is the somewhat surprising observation 
that his perspectives seem to be quite unknown to – or at least are ignored by – many even 
influential Western reading researchers. For example, in the (Norwegian version of) the 
2017 report from The Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), which 
(in 2016) was conducted, with reading comprehension as its main focus, in more than 50 
participating countries (cf. for example Afflerback et al., 2008), Vygotsky’s perspectives 
are not discussed at all. And as the study has been conducted every fifth year since the late 
1990s, it has probably been quite influential, not only in the research community, but also 
among teachers, school leaders and school authorities. 
There are several reasons to discuss how the study may have affected the general dis-
course on metacognition and (reading) strategies, especially as the concept of metacog-
nition is more or less taken for granted in the PIRLS report. Admittedly, the researcher, 
in passing, points out that readers before, during and after reading apply a repertoire of 
linguistic, cognitive and metacognitive skills to construct meaning (Gabrielsen & Strand, 
2017, p. 23). They also refer to dialogues where the students are invited to control and reg-
ulate their own comprehension, reading and learning, as well as goal achievement and the 
relationship between effort and outcome, as metacognitive reflections (Berge, Helgevold, 
& Schulz-Heidorf, 2017, p. 168). These and other similar formulations indicate that what 
is taken for granted in the report is a conception of metacognition which corresponds quite 
closely to the concept as understood both by Vygotsky and in contemporary literature (e.g. 
Pressley 2000). 
The same seems to be the case as far as reading strategies are concerned, as these by 
the PIRLS-researchers and with a reference to Afflerback et al. (2008: 368), are explicitly 
defined as: “… deliberate, goal-directed attempts to control and modify the reader’s efforts 
to decode text, understand words, and construct meanings of texts” (cf. Berge et al. 2017: 
167). As is emphasized in the report that it is the relationship to metacognition that dif-
ferentiates reading strategies from any other reading activity (Berge et al. 2017: 168), the 
formulations that strategies are deliberate, goal-directed attempts to control and modify 
[…] reader’s efforts to […] construct meanings of texts” indeed indicate a conception cor-
responding to Vygotsky’s.
What is somewhat confusing, however, is that the definition of strategies also suggests 
that “… reader’s efforts [should be used] to decode text and understand words. Fluent 
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decoding skills are normally established at the introductory stage, because instruction is 
arranged for reading comprehension to occur spontaneously. Thus, it is improbable that 
students at this level would need to make use of metacognitive skills. But if they do, such 
skills are hardly available to the students, if they enter through the gate opened up by sci-
entific concept. My confusion is also awakened, by the description of the use of strategies 
in relation to word comprehension, as strategies on a surface level (Berge et al. 2017: 168). 
If strategies are “… deliberate, goal-directed attempts to […] understand words… “, at the 
same time as they are also differentiated from other reading activities by their relationship 
to metacognition, they can hardly be functioning on a surface level. 
Of course, some students, e.g. with minority language backgrounds, may need some 
support as far as text decoding and word comprehension are concerned, even at the middle 
stage. But as the students in question often have problems with their reading speed as well 
as with their ability to comprehend more comprehensive narratives” (Kulbrandstad 2003), 
and fluent decoding skills are a prerequisite for the comprehension of more academically 
demanding texts, it is highly improbable that such students will have access to metacogni-
tive strategies for text decoding and word comprehension. This is especially improbable, 
if Vygotsky’s hypothesis is valid, meaning that they will need to develop metacognition, 
while their attention is still preoccupied with the establishment of fluent reading skills. 
Finally, it is also somewhat confusing in the light of Vygotsky’s hypothesis that the 
PIRLS study put relatively great emphasis on the investigation of students’ metacognitive 
skills, including their reading strategies (cf. Gabrielsen & Strand 2017: 23), as long as 
its’ target group is 4th grade students. Although the data collection took place in March, it 
is still improbable that students after only six months of exposure to academic texts and 
concepts should have had any substantial effects on their metacognitive skills. On this 
background, it does not reduce the confusion, however, that the researchers themselves not 
only admit this, but even explicitly point out that the PIRLS study should be considered 
primarily as an indicator of reading competence at the end of the introductory reading 
program (Gabrielsen & Strand 2017: 15).
Of course, there is the alternative interpretation that metacognitive thinking is supposed 
to be trained independently already at the elementary stage in school. But this is an option 
that the PIRLS researchers explicitly does not recommend (Berge et al. 2017: 168,ff.) 
My main motive for addressing Vygotsky’s hypothesis, then, is that influential con-
temporary researchers, at the same time as they seem to share Vygotsky’s assumption that 
strategies are regulated by the reader’s underlying metacognitive abilities, seem unfamil-
iar with his assumption that metacognition and strategic thinking will not develop until 
the students reach the middle stage. This may, at least in the case of the PIRLS study, have 
affected the conception on metacognition and strategies in a way that fosters confusion 
among readers. In this article, I therefore aim to reduce the foundation for confusion, 
by discussing Vygotsky’s hypothesis and its educational implications. And as Vygotsky’s 
conception of reading instruction and the development of reading skills are closely related 
to instruction in general as well as to cognitive development, I will take as my point of 
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departure, Vygotsky’s own view on how cognitive functioning develops, including his 
own comparison with Piaget’s perspective as far as the relationship between instruction 
and cognitive development is concerned. 
















































As summarized in table 1, Vygotsky assumes that each structure of generalization (i.e. 
syncretic, complexes, preconcepts and concepts) corresponds with characteristic thought 
operations associated with a given level of development of word meaning, and a specific 
system of generality and specific types of relationship of generality between general and 
specific concepts (Vygotsky 1987: 225). It is interesting to note that Vygotsky, as far as 
the general picture is concerned, does not point to any major disagreements with Piaget. 
Thus, he shares Piaget’s opinion that all spontaneous concepts (thinking in complexes / 
pre-operational thinking as well as thinking in preconcepts / concrete operational think-
ing) are non-systemic. Further, he supports Piaget’s observation that the child’s thought is 
insufficiently connected or deductive and that the need to avoid contradiction is generally 
absent in his thinking. Vygotsky shares the view that the child’s thought is more similar to 
a collection of lines flowing from the action or day-dream than it is to the adult’s thought, 
which is systematic and characterized by conscious awareness (Vygotsky 1987: 234). 
Finally, Vygotsky also supports Piaget’s opinion that the absence of a system is an es-
sential feature of the spontaneous concept (Vygotsky 1987: 234, 236). What Piaget does 
not understand, however, Vygotsky remarks, is that the nonsystemic nature of these con-
cepts is not simply one of many features of the child’s thought. It is in fact the root that 




As an introduction to the general argument which I will develop in the following, Vy-
gotsky illustrates the difference between thinking with preconcepts and thinking by means 
of non-spontaneous concepts – by clarifying the implications for thinking of the concept 
flower in relation to concepts like rose, rose, violet, or lily. He states: 
The relationship of the word flower to the object is completely different for the child who 
does not yet know the words rose, violet, or lily than it is for the child who does (Vygotsky 
1987: 234, italics added). 
This relationship is characterized by the fact that it [flower] is mediated through other con-
cepts [rose/violet]. Consequently, in its relationship to the object, the non-spontaneous (sci-
entific) concept [flower] includes a relationship to another concept, that is, it includes the 
most basic elements of a concept system (Vygotsky 1987: 192, italics added.), [meaning that] 
“… a different relationship between the concept and the object develops. Supra-empirical 
connections between concepts become possible” (Vygotsky 1987: 234, italics added). 
The reason why the flower concept implicates the most basic elements of a concept 
system, Vygotsky explains, is therefore that the relationship of:
[…] subordinate concepts to the given concept must be defined by the system created by the 
higher concept. If this were not so, the higher concept would not be higher than the given 
concept. This higher concept [then] presupposes both the hierarchical system and concepts 
subordinate and systematically related to the given concept. Thus, the generalization of the 
concept leads to its localization within a definite system of generality. These relations are the 
foundation and the most natural and important connections among concepts. Thus, at one 
and the same time, generalization [also] implies the conscious awareness and the systemati-
zation of concepts (Vygotsky 1987: 192, italics added). 
Implications
One implication of Vygotsky’s argument thus far, is that categorization most fundamen-
tally, involves generalization, i.e. the establishment of relations between elements based 
on similarity. In spite of the extrasystemic nature of the child’s spontaneous thinking, it re-
flects the capacity for generalization. The limitation, however, is that”… the only possible 
connections between concepts [which exist outside a system], are those that exist between 
the objects themselves, that is, empirical connections (Vygotsky 1987: 234), which often 
may reflect superfluous similarities. 
Thus, in order for generalization to be systematic, it also requires that the individual 
is able to identify the abstract traits of the object, which is essential for the inclusion in 
a certain category. What is needed for thinking in concepts (formal operational thought), 
then, is the ability to categorize elements according to common components in reference 
How metacognition and (reading) strategies develop according to Vygotsky 33
(Rommetveit 1972), an ability that does not appears in the child’s cognition before the 
age of eleven, and which is not stabilized before the age of thirteen (cf. Fox & Riscon-
scente 2008). Because abstraction not only involves the capacity to distinguish certain 
important characteristics of an object, but also to keep these characteristics in mind with-
out having to attach it to specific objects in the room, they need to be formulated. This 
is why the transition to operations mediated by signs appear late in the child’s thinking 
(Vygotsky 1987: 133).
It follows from this argument that individuals who do not master the art of abstraction, 
will also have problems with precise generalization, which is precisely the weakness that 
is reflected in the child’s spontaneous concepts, and which can be traced back to their 
extrasystemic nature. When complexes are characterized by overgeneralizations, then, it 
is because the child cannot generalize in a systematic way, because he does not yet master 
the ability of abstraction. 
The system and its fundamental importance
According to Vygotsky, the identification of the essential traits needed is possible only 
within a definite system of generality, where, as already indicated: “… a different rela-
tionship between the concept and the object develops” (Vygotsky 1987: 234). The rose 
example shows that the most basic elements of a concept system is that the relationship 
of subordinate concepts to a given concept must be defined by the system created by the 
higher concept, so that “Supra-empirical connections between concepts become possible” 
(Vygotsky 1987: 234). Accordingly, it is only within a system that the relationships be-
tween concepts begin to emerge. And when these relationships are formulated verbally, 
they mediate the concept’s relationship to the object through its relationship to other con-
cepts (Vygotsky 1987). 
The inadequate nature of the child’s deductions, which Piaget also points out, therefore 
stems from an underdevelopment of the connections among concepts along the longitu-
dinal axis representing the relationships of generality (Vygotsky 1987: 235), which make 
the child insensitive to the contradictions present in his own judgment. Contradiction can 
only be sensed, when two contradictory judgments are viewed as particular cases of a sin-
gle, more general concept. Where concepts are not included in some system, however, this 
type of relationship among concepts is absent (Vygotsky 1987: 235). 
In fact, this type of relationship according to Vygotsky, is impossible without the con-
cepts’ inclusion in some system, i.e. without systematic abstraction, because what the 
mediation process will make explicit, as it takes place in a systematic way within a hier-
archical system of concepts, is precisely the criteria needed to counteract the overgener-
alization (or under-generalization) of complexive and pre-operational thinking. Moreover, 
in order to be able to control and to regulate generalization (and thinking), this ability is 
necessary. Thus, it is thinking within a system, through the identification and definition 
of systematic concept relations, which secures that the processes of generalization, is bal-
Thor Ola Engen34
anced by the process of abstraction. At this point, we are getting close to the emergence of 
metacognitive control and regulation.
Instruction
These processes cannot just occur spontaneously, Vygotsky claims. According to their 
systematic nature, they need to be established in instruction: 
While spontaneous concepts (rose – violet – lily) create the potential for the emergence of 
nonspontaneous (scientific) concepts in the process of instruction, instruction is the source 
of the development of this kind of new concept (Vygotsky 1987: 194, italics added). 
Instruction begins with the work on the concepts verbal definition, with the mental opera-
tions [especially abstraction] that presuppose the nonspontaneous application of this con-
cept (Vygotsky 1987: 217). Arising from above, from the womb of other concepts within 
a system, they are born through relationships of generality among concepts that are estab-
lished in the process of instruction. By their very nature, scientific concepts in themselves 
include something of these relationships, some aspect of a system of concepts (Vygotsky 
1987: 236), i.e. implicit criteria for abstraction, and these are clarified – in instruction – in 
relation to the system. This is why the scientific concept is of such extraordinary impor-
tance for the history of the child’s mental development. 
Verbalization in instruction
Thus, and even more importantly, it is when the criteria of abstraction needed to balance 
generalization are articulated in instruction they are also made available for conscious at-
tention and conscious awareness. In this way, children become consciously aware of the 
concept and its relations to other concepts and the object. Thus, when students in instruc-
tion are working with concepts within a system, they are also gradually enabled to monitor 
or supervise their own thinking, in a way that enable them to conduct a continuous control 
of their own comprehension and effort (Vygotsky 1987: 194), which is exactly what meta-
cognitive skills is all about. 
Conclusion
It is on this background Vygotsky formulates the conclusion that it is only within a system 
that the concept can acquire:
“…conscious awareness and a voluntary nature. Conscious awareness and the presence of 
a system are synonyms when we are speaking of concepts, just as spontaneity, lack conscious 
awareness, and the absence of a system are three different words for designating the nature 
of the child’s concept (Vygotsky 1987: 191–192, italics added). 
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From this argument, it follows that the kind of thinking, which allows children to sense 
contraction in their own judgment, must be systematic in the sense that generalization is 
balanced by abstraction. When this ability, which implies the ability to think about one’s 
own thinking, and which arises in the child’s thinking as part of the development of their 
scientific concepts, their mental development is also raised to a higher stage (Vygotsky 
1987: 236). The criteria of metacognition are not fulfilled, however, until the articulation 
of criteria for abstraction (and generalization) takes place, so that children gradually be-
come consciously aware of the concept and its relations. It is not until this stage they are 
being enabled to monitor or supervise their own thinking, so that they continuously can 
control their own comprehension and effort. 
As this also happens when children in instruction are working with concepts within 
a system, children’s ability to control and regulate their own mental processes in a sys-
tematic way, are not only metacognitively related skills. They are based on the same skills 
that constitute metacognition, the ability to avoid contradiction in one’s own judgment, 
mediated by the ability to balance generalization and abstraction. 
In Vygotsky’s view, then, the system (of concepts) is the cardinal point around which the 
whole history of concept development in the school age revolves, accordingly also the rea-
son why conscious awareness – metacognition – as well strategic thinking, enters through 
the gate opened up by scientific concept (Vygotsky 1987: 191). Accordingly, the capability to 
monitor or supervise, control and regulate one’s own thinking cannot be established before 
children in school start working with academic texts and concepts, i.e. at the middle stage. 
In addition, neither metacognition nor strategic (systematic) thinking can be established out-
side of the world of academic texts and instruction, as independent skills. 
Following Vygotsky’s hypothesis, then, metacognitive skills are not available for stu-
dents at the introductory level, as the PIRLS report implies. Further, they are hardly avail-
able for students at 4th grade level in the PIRLS-study either. This is especially the case 
because Vygotsky claims that the effect of working with scientific concepts only gradually 
results in a more complete restructuring of the spontaneous concepts (Vygotsky 1987: 
191). This statement is supported by Rommetveits finding that the ability to categorize 
elements according to common components in reference is not stabilized until the child 
is thirteen years old, although it appears two years earlier. It is also supported by Piaget’s 
position that concrete operational thinking by nature is extrasystemic. 
What I have managed to show in this article then is that Vygotsky’s hypothesis that 
metacognitive abilities “… enter through the gate opened up by scientific concept” (Vy-
gotsky 1987: 191) has the potential to clarify the confusion as to what metacognition is, 
and how it is developed, awakened by the PIRLS report. Therefore, researchers should not 
just ignore it when they plan and conduct studies. Before omitting it, they should articulate 
explicitly why it is not relevant for research on metacognition and strategies in reading. 
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